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“  The  goals  we  pursue  are  always  veiled”,  Milan  Kundera
wrote  in  The  Unbearable  Lightness  of  Being  (1984).  “A  girl
who  longs  for  marriage  longs  for  something  she  knows
nothing  about.  The  boy  who  hankers  after  fame  has  no  idea
what  fame  is.  The  thing  that  gives  our  every  move  its
meaning  is  always  totally  unknown  to  us.”  Kundera  was
exaggerating.  Unmarried  people  know  a  lot  about  marriage,
and  even  nobodies  know  something  about  fame.  We  know
that  both  marriage  and  fame  have  their  satisfactions,  but
also  that  the  happiness  they  bring  can  be  short-­lived;;  that  a
marriage  without  companionship,  like  fame  without  merit,  is  a  castle  built  on  sand.  So  in  what  sense  are  these
things  “totally  unknown  to  us”?  Kundera  might  say:  the  unwed  and  the  nobodies  doubtless  know  a  great  many
objective  facts  about  marriage  and  fame,  but  they  still  don’t  know  what  it’s  like  to  be  married  or  famous.  Some
things  can  only  be  fully  known  from  the  inside.  And  this  includes  the  most  important  things,  the  things  that
give  our  lives  and  choices  their  meaning.
In  1982,  two  years  before  the  publication  of  The  Unbearable  Lightness  of  Being,  the  philosopher  Frank  Jackson
described  a  thought  experiment  in  which  a  brilliant  scientist  named  Mary  lives  her  entire  life  in  a  black-­and-­
white  room,  learning  everything  there  is  to  know  about  the  science  of  vision  from  black-­and-­white  textbooks.
(Anyone  who  has  seen  Alex  Garland’s  recent  film  Ex  Machina  will  recognize  the  case,  though  Jackson  goes
uncited.)  Mary  knows  exactly  how  different  wavelengths  stimulate  the  retina,  how  the  brain  processes  this
visual  information,  and  how  normal  people  use  words  such  as  “red”  and  “green”  to  describe  their  visual
experiences.  Nonetheless,  Jackson  argued,  if  Mary  were  to  walk  out  into  the  real  world,  she  would  learn
something  new.  For  the  first  time,  she  would  learn  what  colours  look  like;;  for  the  first  time,  she  would  know
what  it  is  to  experience  red  from  the  inside.  Perhaps  Kundera  thought  that  the  husband-­hunting  girl  and  the
fame-­lusting  boy  are  like  deluded  Marys:  they  yearn  for  redness  without  even  knowing  what  it  looks  like.
If  L.  A.  Paul  is  right,  then  we  are  all  in  Mary’s  black-­and-­white  room,  trying  to  decide  whether  or  not  to  have
experiences  we  haven’t  had,  and  so  don’t  really  understand.  The  upshot  is  that  many  of  our  decisions  cannot  be
made  rationally:  we  can’t  rationally  choose  to  have  experiences  we  don’t  understand,  but  equally  we  can’t
rationally  choose  not  to  have  such  experiences.  By  “rationally”  Paul  means  according  to  the  dictates  of
normative  decision  theory,  the  area  of  philosophy  and  economics  that  offers  a  formal  algorithm  for  how  self-­
interested  creatures  should  make  decisions.  (Most  philosophers  think  that  rationality  extends  beyond  self-­
interest,  but  decision  theory  only  concerns  “rationality”  in  the  narrow,  self-­interested  sense.)  Normative
decision  theory  tells  us  that  we  should  choose  the  action  that  has  the  highest  expected  value.  So  if  I’m  deciding
whether  to  go  and  see  a  new  film,  I  should  think  about  how  happy  it  will  make  me  if  it’s  good,  how  miserable  it
will  make  me  if  it’s  bad,  and  weigh  each  of  those  outcomes  by  how  probable  I  think  it  is.  If  going  to  see  the  film
has  the  higher  expected  value,  then  I  should  head  to  the  cinema;;  if  not,  I  should  stay  at  home.  Paul’s  worry  is
this:  if  we  can’t  know  what  experiences  are  like  unless  we’ve  already  had  them,  then  we  can’t  know  how  happy
or  miserable  they  would  make  us,  and  so  can’t  know  which  numbers  to  plug  into  our  decision-­making
algorithm.  In  the  language  of  decision  theory,  if  I  can’t  know  what  possible  outcomes  would  be  like,  then  I  can’t
know  what  values  to  assign  to  them,  and  therefore  can’t  determine  which  action  maximizes  expected  value.
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Choosing  whether  to  have  novel  experience  is  like  deciding  whether  to  buy  a  lottery  ticket  without  knowing  how
much  prize  money  is  at  stake.
It’s  not  clear  that  this  is  a  damning  problem  for  decision  theory.  I’ve  never  had  an  allexpenses-­paid  holiday  to
Bora  Bora.  I  don’t  know  what  that  experience  is  like  “from  the  inside”.  But  I’m  confident  that  I’d  enjoy  it
immensely.  I’m  also  confident  that  I  wouldn’t  much  enjoy  being  mauled  by  a  shark,  though  I’ve  never  had  that
experience  either.  Actually  experiencing  either  of  these  things  doesn’t  seem  necessary  for  working  out  how
much  I  should  value  or  disvalue  them.  Paul  concedes  that  this  is  true  of  many,  perhaps  most,  experiences:  we
don’t  have  to  know  what  they’re  like  to  know  how  much  to  value  them.  But  she  insists  that  a  special  class  of
experiences  –  a  class  that  includes  having  a  child,  going  to  war,  moving  to  a  foreign  country,  and  taking  LSD  –
aren’t  like  this.  If  we’re  to  know  how  much  to  value  these  experiences,  we  need  to  know  exactly  what  they’re
like.
What  makes  having  a  child  different  in  this  respect  from  being  mauled  by  a  shark?  Even  if  we  don’t  have  first-­
hand  experience  of  parenthood,  after  all,  we  still  have  plenty  of  information  on  which  to  draw.  Frank  parents
will  tell  you  all  about  the  particular  mixture  of  intense  love,  routine  and  exhaustion  that  the  experience
involves.  You  might  not  know  exactly  what  they’re  talking  about,  but  you  don’t  hear  it  as  pure  nonsense  either.
The  same  goes  for  anecdotal  accounts  of  war,  emigration  or  LSD.  They  might  not  take  us  right  inside  the
experience,  but  they  can  get  us  pretty  close.  (What  is  a  novelist  like  Kundera  doing  if  not  showing  us  something
of  what  it  is  like  to  live  and  love  under  totalitarianism?)  With  a  little  research  and  forethought,  you  can  also  gain
a  reasonably  clear  idea  of  how  having  children  would  change  your  economic  circumstances,  your  professional
prospects,  your  leisure  time,  your  relationship  with  your  partner,  and  the  kinds  of  practical  and  moral  challenge
you  face.  Psychological  research  might  even  help  you  to  predict  how  happy  parenthood  would  make  you.  (To  be
fair,  the  results  of  parental  happiness  studies  are  mixed,  though  it’s  clear  that  everyone  loves  being  a
grandparent.)  We  don’t  know  everything,  but  there’s  plenty  we  do  and  can  know  about  parenthood.  Isn’t  that
enough  to  decide  whether  it’s  for  us?
Paul  thinks  it  isn’t.  How  do  you  know,  she  asks,  that  all  this  third-­party  evidence  –  friends’  anecdotes  and  the
deliverances  of  empirical  psychology  –  applies  to  you?  Maybe  you  are  totally  unlike  other  people:  maybe  you
will  be  apathetic  about  your  children,  where  your  friends  feel  obsessive  love.  Given  this  possibility,  Paul  argues,
you  shouldn’t  use  information  about  other  people  in  order  to  make  decisions  about  yourself.  But  by  this
reasoning,  you  shouldn’t  use  the  fact  that  other  people  haven’t  enjoyed  being  mauled  by  sharks  as  evidence  that
you  wouldn’t:  maybe  you  would  experience  it  as  an  ecstatic  thrill.  If  the  possibility  that  I  am  not  like  most  other
people  undermines  my  ability  to  make  rational  decisions  on  the  basis  of  third-­party  evidence,  then  it  follows
that  I  can’t  rationally  choose  not  to  be  mauled  by  a  shark.  That  would  be  an  odd  result.
In  any  case,  Paul  seems  to  have  a  deeper  worry  about  the  use  of  third-­party  evidence  for  first-­person  decision-­
making.  She  suggests  that  it  can  be  “inauthentic”  to  draw  on  such  data  in  making  our  decisions;;  doing  so,  she
says,  risks  giving  up  personal  ownership  of  our  choices.  When  we  make  decisions  “for  ourselves”,  we  project
ourselves  into  imaginary  scenarios  to  discover  how  we’d  feel  about  them;;  we  don’t  allow  the  question  to  be
settled  by  the  latest  happiness  study.  So  Paul’s  worry  isn’t  that  there  is  no  rational  way  to  make  life  decisions,
but  instead  that  subjecting  our  life  decisions  to  rational  scrutiny  is  existentially  problematic:  an  act  of  self-­
alienation.
Paul  is  right  that  there  can  be  something  dissonant  in  using  third-­party  evidence  to  make  a  personal  decision,
especially  when  what  you  imagine  is  different  from  what  others  tell  you.  Suppose  you  imagine  having  a  child,
and  all  you  can  see  is  an  owl-­eyed  infant,  and  then  a  scampering  toddler,  and  finally  the  crisp  autumn  day  when
you  drop  your  wunderkind  off  for  her  first  day  at  university.  Your  parent  friends  tell  you  instead  about  sleepless
nights  and  tantrums  and  sour-­faced  adolescence.  But  you  can’t  internalize  it;;  the  projection  won’t  budge.  You
can’t  help  feeling  that  for  you  it  would  be  different,  that  for  you  it  would  be  unpunctuated  bliss.  The  question  is:
would  it  be  worryingly  inauthentic  of  you,  as  Paul  suggests,  to  listen  to  your  friends  and  discount  your  happy
imaginings?  Or,  on  the  contrary,  would  it  be  inauthentic  of  you  not  to  do  so?
Study  after  study  shows  that  we  all  think  we’re  special:  the  average  person  thinks  that  he  or  she  is  smarter,
better-­looking  and  more  talented  than  average.  Most  drivers  think  they  are  better  and  safer  drivers  than
average.  Thinking  you’re  special  is  part  of  what  it  means  to  be  just  like  everyone  else.  The  really  special  people
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are  those  who  don’t  think  they’re  special:  studies  suggest  that  depressed  people  have  an  uncanny  sense  of  how
average  they  are.  Perhaps,  then,  an  authentic  relationship  to  ourselves  requires  us  to  recognize  the  ways  in
which  we  are  not  special,  including  our  predictable  insistence  on  our  own  uniqueness.  Authenticity  requires  us
to  be  able  to  take  what  P.  F.  Strawson  has  called  an  “objective  stance”  even  towards  ourselves.  Paul  is  right
when  she  says  that  reconciling  the  subjective  and  objective  stances  –  seeing  ourselves  both  from  the  inside  and
from  without  –  is  enormously  difficult.  But  all  the  same,  authenticity  in  the  age  of  Big  Data  might  require  me  to
do  the  difficult  thing,  and  to  see  myself  sometimes  as  just  another  statistic.
There  is  another  way  that  having  children  and  being  mauled  by  a  shark  might  differ.  Before  you’ve  been  mauled
by  a  shark,  you  have  a  strong  preference  not  to  be;;  and  that  preference  probably  won’t  shift  once  you’ve  been
mauled.  Having  a  child,  however,  often  does  change  our  preferences,  and  changes  them  profoundly.  Before
having  children,  we  might  strongly  value  spending  time  alone  or  in  pursuit  of  professional  ambitions.  But  after
having  children,  spending  time  with  them  and  pursuing  their  well-­being  might  trump  everything  else.  Some
experiences  can  alter  us  radically  and  permanently;;  not  just  what  we  value,  but  who  we  take  ourselves  to  be.
Paul  calls  such  experiences  “personally  transformative”.  Not  only  do  I  learn  what  they’re  like  only  once  I  have
them:  having  them  also  changes  what  it’s  like  to  be  me.  Not  only  that;;  these  experiences  change  us  in  totally
unpredictable  ways.  All  this  uncertainty,  Paul  argues,  makes  it  doubly  impossible  to  decide  rationally  whether
to  have  such  experiences.
Again,  I  think  the  significant  issue  here  is  not  about  the  rationality  of  decision-­making,  but  about  the  ethics  of
making  decisions  rationally.  Paul  insists  that,  just  as  I  have  no  idea  what  it  would  be  like  to  have  a  child,  I  have
no  idea  how  having  a  child  would  change  what  it’s  like  to  be  me.  But  surely  this  is  wrong.  I  have  watched  many
friends  and  family  members  become  parents.  I  can  see  how  they’ve  changed.  And  unless  I’m  special  (the  odds
are  that  I’m  not),  I,  too,  would  change  in  similar  ways.  I’d  find  unknown  reservoirs  of  energy;;  I’d  smile  wistfully
when  childless  friends  told  me  about  their  spontaneous  nights  out;;  I’d  start  carrying  wet  wipes  with  me  at  all
times.  The  worry  is  not  that  I  don’t  know  how  I  might  change,  but  that  it’s  so  predictable  how  I  would  change.
The  worry  isn’t  epistemic,  but  existential:  is  this  the  person  I  should  choose  to  become?
Some  experiences  can  transform  us  so  much  that  to  choose  them  feels  like  betrayal  or  suicide.  That’s  because
our  sense  of  who  we  are  is  bound  up  with  the  things  we  value.  Our  preferences  and  tastes  –  in  books,  clothes,
movies,  music,  leisure,  food  –  aren’t  just  arbitrary  facts  about  us.  When  we  change  our  values,  we  change
ourselves.  At  the  limit,  we  may  become  unrecognizable  to  our  former  selves;;  we  might  even  make  new  selves,
killing  off  the  old.  The  prospect  of  such  a  change  can  be  painful  even  when  we  make  no  judgement  on  the
prospective  self.  I  might  see  nothing  morally  wrong  with  being  a  homebody,  but  if  I’m  a  committed  hedonist,
then  the  prospect  of  turning  into  someone  who  just  wants  to  stay  in  will  be  unwelcome,  not  because  I  think  I
would  thereby  turn  into  a  bad  person,  but  because  I  will  have  become  a  different  person,  a  person  who  does  not
share  my  values,  a  person  with  whom  I  cannot  identify.  This  is  so  even  though  I  know  that  person  will  feel
content  to  have  put  aside  the  childish  things  that  thrill  the  present  me.  What  I  see  as  an  act  of  self-­betrayal,  this
other  person,  this  other-­me,  sees  as  growing  up.  Which  of  us  is  right?
This  is  a  deep  issue,  and  one  that  decision  theory  cannot  resolve.  But  that  isn’t  because  of  any  failure  on  its  part;;
decision  theory  is  simply  silent  on  the  question  of  how  we  should  value  the  selves  we  might  become.  That
question  has  always  been  for  us,  not  the  algorithm.
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